Links am Abend: NATO ohne US?, Grönland gegen Spitzbergen, Ukraine-Frontbericht

Kein Blogeintrag im eigentlichen Sinnne: ich werfe hier ein paar Links rein, die ich in den nächsten Tagen vielleicht brauchen kann – und warum soll ich sie nur für mich aufschreiben. Also:

• Die Financial Times berichtet aus Brüssel, es gebe strukturierte Gespräche (auch Deutschland sei dabei) für einen Langfristplan zum US-Ausstieg aus der NATO:

European military powers work on 5-10 year plan to replace US in Nato
UK, France, Germany and Nordics among countries engaged in informal discussions over a managed transfer
Europe’s biggest military powers are drawing up plans to take on greater responsibilities for the continent’s defence from the US, including a pitch to the Trump administration for a managed transfer over the next five to 10 years.

• Russland erhebt zunehmend Ansprüche auf Svalbard (in Deutschland meist als Spitzbergen bezeichnet), und es scheine sogar ein Deal zwischen den USA und Russland für die Aufteilung der Arktis denkbar, berichtet der Eurasia Daily Monitor: Grönland für Trump, Svalbard für Putin.

Moscow has declared that Oslo strengthening its defenses on Svalbard is a violation of the Svalbard Treaty, implying that Russia views itself as a defender of that treaty and could take military action to defend it.
Nikolai Patrushev, a hardline Kremlin aide close to Putin, has supported this response and declared that the West is threatening Russia across the north, believing Moscow must act now to defend its national interests.
Russia’s own approach, however, has had one of its senior participants in talks with the United States to persuade that now is not the time for a “cold war” in the Arctic but rather for a comprehensive “deal.”

• Michael Kofmann, bei der Carnegie-Stiftung der Spezialist für russische und ukrainische Streitkräfte, hat in einem langen Thread auf X seine jüngsten Beobachtungen an der Front im Osten der Ukraine aufgeschrieben. Aus dem Thread:

Russian offensive momentum slowed significantly over the winter, though it is premature to claim that the front has stabilized, especially following AFU withdrawal in Kursk.
Russian advances were stalled for three reasons: materiel exhaustion from losses in the fall, effective Ukrainian adaptation to how Russian forces were prosecuting offensive operations, and winter weather conditions which affected the pace of operations.
This dynamic may not hold as we get further into the spring. Russian forces appear to be regrouping for renewed offensive operations. Ukrainian forces have improved tactically at countering how RF fight, employing UAS to compensate for a deficit of manpower at the front.