Hubris and conceit: Why Musk is having so much trouble as czar

A disruptive president bent on reshaping federal government operations pushed and even broke longstanding constitutional and legal norms. It created confusion and worry in the public and the halls of Congress. The president even selected one of the wealthiest individuals in the U.S. to head a newly created government entity, under questionable legal authority.

No, we're not talking about President Trump, but about Woodrow Wilson. In 1917, he established the War Industries Board and named Wall Street financier Bernard Baruch to head it. Baruch was given sweeping powers to oversee material production for the war effort, all under a newly formed entity not authorized by Congress. 

Wilson would not be the last president to utilize what became known as White House “czars” — executive branch officials appointed by the president without Senate confirmation but given significant decision-making authority to affect spending and administer or coordinate programs, departments and agencies.

We say this not to provide evidence that what is currently happening in the federal government with Elon Musk and the so-called Department of Government Efficiency is normal — only that czars represent a larger phenomenon to give presidents more independence from Congress and unilateral control over government operations.

Many are surprised by the way the Republican-controlled Congress has acquiesced and even supported DOGE’s activities. But this is not the first time that Congress has done little or nothing to challenge presidential authority to create offices, usurp legislative power or otherwise centralize power in czar positions. Under Wilson, a Democratic Congress enabled the president’s unprecedented use of power. Under President Franklin Roosevelt, another Democratic Congress voiced little objection as he unilaterally established the Office of Production Management and other czar positions.

In 1943, Congress tried to rein in Roosevelt’s free-wheeling use of presidentially created entities by seeking to require Senate confirmation for certain executive positions. Although the bill died in the House that year, Congress later passed a law that denied funding to any presidentially created entity that had been in existence for one year and lacked a clear statutory basis to exist. 

Despite the law, czars keep being appointed. Both political parties have at times objected to them. Republican lawmakers and conservative pundits loudly objected to the President Barack Obama’s use of czars. Today, we see Democratic and liberal groups not only questioning Musk but also suing in federal court to challenge DOGE’s constitutional and legal authority.

There is bipartisan support for improving government efficiency. Such thinking is not new — academics, lawmakers and even presidential staff members have been highlighting the systemic design problems in the federal government for decades. Various presidentially created commissions have studied and developed plans to overhaul the executive branch, with all concluding that our government’s structure is outmoded and ineffective.

Going back to the early 1970s, a commission created by President Richard Nixon recommended consolidating the existing 12 departments (now 15) into four super-departments, to maximize efficiency and coordination. That did not happen, but the commission’s general conclusion remains valid: The expansion of government structures and personnel in a piecemeal fashion created inefficiencies and management challenges at the federal level.

Despite the consensus that the federal government needs to be reformed, the approach of using a single, high-profile individual such as Musk to spearhead sweeping reforms unilaterally — such as cutting spending and firing employees — is not the most thoughtful or effective solution.

As with any large organization, the federal government is a complex system with a long history and many interrelated parts that need to be studied and analyzed before beginning the process of redesign. This complexity requires any effort to overhaul the system to be methodical and nuanced. Unilateral actions, driven by a czar with no expertise in government or in the particular functions of the many departments and agencies, risk overlooking important interconnected aspects or causing unintended consequences that could exacerbate the very inefficiencies being targeted.

Musk represents a pernicious feature of the modern presidency, born in hubris and conceit, that the executive has all the answers and need not be constrained by supposedly outmoded constitutional and legal considerations. Congress must wake up from its slumber and take the lead in addressing these governance challenges.

This need not be partisan. Republicans in Congress protested Obama’s czars. In now embracing Trump’s vastly more expansive use of this position because they might like the policy outcomes, they are setting a precedent for a future Democratic president to do the same to advance policies they detest.

Congress needs to get back to checking presidential overreach in use of executive powers, without regard to fear or partisan favor.

Mitchel A. Sollenberger is professor of political science at University of Michigan-Dearborn. Mark J. Rozell is dean of the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. They are co-authors of “The President’s Czars: Undermining Congress and the Constitution.”