Is there a foreign policy ‘Trump Doctrine’?
While Trump might consider withdrawing land forces from overseas bases, American naval and air forces are likely to be a different matter.

The furor that President Trump provoked with his proposal to relocate all of Gaza’s residents has overshadowed what appears to be a new but unstated American policy — a variant of what has come to be called a strategy of “offshore balancing.”
This concept, as outlined by a group of international relations theorists who style themselves “realists,” calls for the U.S. to remove itself not only from becoming involved in regional conflicts, but for the most part withdrawing its forces from bases on foreign territory.
“Offshore balancing” has its roots in a 19th-century British policy that sought to maintain a balance of power in Europe while London remained aloof from commitments abroad. Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh was the first to implement the policy when he successfully prevented the 1815 Congress of Vienna from imposing punishing terms on France after its defeat in the Napoleonic Wars. Five years later, he articulated London’s non-intervention policy, which held fast for almost a century thereafter.
Trump has made it clear that in his second term he too would prefer that the U.S. not be tied down in any region — although he has yet to withdraw any of America’s overseas forces, including those stationed in Germany. He reportedly wants to withdraw 20,000 troops from Europe, representing about one-fifth of the forces currently stationed there. He appears ready to demand that Europeans subsidize the 80,000 troops that would remain there, with the implied threat that, absent such subsidies, most of them might also be brought home.
Similarly, Trump appears poised to withdraw the approximately 24,000 U.S. troops stationed in Korea. He reportedly considered withdrawing them during his first term, but both Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper convinced him to withhold any decision until his second term. Both men are no longer in Trump’s good books, and while the second term that they had in mind did not immediately materialize, it is now a reality.
Nevertheless, while Trump might consider withdrawing land forces from overseas bases, American naval and air forces are likely to be a different matter. Both in his first term and now at the outset of his second, Trump has called upon both sets of forces to conduct strikes against America’s enemies.
In April 2017, in response to the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons against Syrian rebel forces, Trump authorized an air strike against the regime’s Sharyat Air Base, from which Washington assessed government aircraft had carried out a chemical weapons strike a few days earlier. The American attack consisted of 59 Tomahawk missiles that had been launched from two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.
Moreover, Trump authorized numerous air strikes as part of the coalition fighting the terrorist organization ISIS. The air strikes incorporated attacks by fighters, bombers, helicopters and drones, and they continued throughout Trump’s first term.
In January 2020, Trump ordered a drone strike killing Iranian General Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force that managed Tehran’s extraterritorial terrorist operations. The strike also killed four members of the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia known as the Popular Mobilization Forces, including one of its leaders, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. The drone appears to have been launched from America’s al-Udeid air base in Qatar.
Finally, at the beginning of this month, Trump ordered an air attack on ISIS cave complexes in the semi-autonomous Puntland region of Somalia. Fighters launched from the aircraft carrier Harry S. Truman, operating in the Red Sea, launched the attacks. The strikes marked the first major military operation of Trump’s second term, and reprised his earlier pattern of relying on air strikes against enemy targets.
The president has not as yet articulated a “Trump Doctrine” in the manner of many of his predecessors, beginning with Harry Truman. He may yet do so. But in practice, he is already implementing one. Trump will not completely withdraw America’s overseas land presence, if only to maintain bases from which air strikes can be launched and ships can be serviced. Instead, he will rely primarily on land-based and naval air forces to pursue America’s military aims.
At the same time, Trump, as he did in his first term, will continue to press America’s allies to dedicate far more of their budgets to provide for their own defenses. By doing so, he would further cement his vision of a 21st-century America that would free itself from entangling land-based wars and instead operate, like 19th-century Britain, as the world’s great “offshore balancer.”
Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.